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analyst of the military aspect of the rebalance to comment 
that “(f)rankly, despite the hype about a “pivot” to Asia, we 
found that the policy largely built upon existing plans and 
policies started in the Bush and even Clinton administra-
tions”.3 Amidst protestations from many in the US defense 
establishment that “we never left” Asia in the first place, and 
facing stronger criticism that the pivot has over-promised 
and under-delivered, defense officials have articulated both 
a short-term and a long-term vision of (and timeframe for) 
the rebalance. 
In the short term, Pentagon officials have underscored that 
the rebalance is already being implemented every day, argu-
ing that “the rebalance is not a goal, not a promise, or a 
vision — it’s a reality.” This emphasis is partially driven by 
the fact that since military deployments are more visible than 
diplomatic and economic initiatives, the DoD has had a dis-
proportionate burden of “signaling” active implementation 
of rebalance policy vis-à-vis other government departments. 
With an insatiable demand for concrete examples of the 
rebalance, the DoD has used a series of public speeches 
between 2011 and 2014 to highlight what Defense Secre-
tary Hagel has ironically referred to as his “litany of moving 
assets and posture.” This repetitive public process of listing 
what the DoD is already doing in the region includes the fol-
lowing: new Littoral Combat Ship deployments in Singapore 
and Marine rotations in Darwin Australia; planned deploy-
ment targets favoring Asia (e.g. from the current 51 to 58 
ships by next year, and 60% of US naval assets, or 67 ships, 
deployed in the Pacific by 2020); new regional Foreign Mili-
tary Sales (FMS) (e.g. Apache helicopter sales to Indonesia); 
new tactical aircraft deployments (e.g. F-22s, P-8s, V-22s in 
Japan); and recent alliance modernization successes such as 
progress on troop realignment in Okinawa and a new agree-
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Introduction 
This policy brief is designed to provide a brief overview of 
the military dimension of the Obama administration’s signa-
ture foreign policy initiative: the pivot, or rebalance to Asia. 
Although the military dimension is only one of several pillars 
of the rebalance, it is arguable that “the security component of 
U.S. rebalancing is the essential framework supporting other 
national efforts.”1 Yet despite this significance and the high 
degree of scrutiny this policy has received, its military com-
ponent remains poorly understood. In particular, questions 
and skepticism persist regarding its purpose, its scope, and 
the ability of the Obama administration to see it implemented. 
This paper sets out to accomplish two limited objectives. 
First, it attempts to explain why the US military rebalance 
to Asia should be viewed through both a short-term (current 
and ongoing) and a long-term (decades long) lens. Efforts to 
measure or even understand the US military rebalance to Asia 
need to be sensitive to two simultaneous and overlapping US 
Department of Defense (DoD) requirements: 1) a short-term 
policy of signaling presence and determination to regional 
actors; 2) a broader long-term geostrategic rebalancing to 
Asia that is part of (yet transcends) Obama administration 
defense policy. Second, this policy brief provides a quick 
heuristic map of the breadth of the military rebalance by 
focusing on the six key components as generally articulated 
by the Pentagon itself.      
The Long and Short of It
The rebalance to Asia is the Obama administration’s key 
foreign policy initiative originating in a series of public 
announcements in late 2011 and early 2012.2  Yet the rebal-
ance (and specifically its military dimension) also contains a 
strong degree of continuation of work carried out by previous 
US administrations. This continuity has led one well-placed 
1  Wallace Gregson, “Rebalancing U.S. Security Posture in Asia”, Asia Policy 
July 14 2012 p.47.
2 See Hilary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy  October 11 
2011. 
3  Michael Green, ‘A Strategy for enhancing our alliances and partnerships in 
the Asia Pacific’ Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee. April 25, 2013. 
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4 Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s speech at CSIS in Washing-
ton DC on April 8 2013 provided one of the most detailed lists of moving 
military assets in support of the rebalance. 
5 Interview, Dan Blumenthal, Director of Asian Studies, American Enterprise 
Institute. Washington DC, December 2013. 
6 Interview with OSD official. December 2013, Pentagon, Washington DC.  
7 Interview, former US administration official currently working on rebal-
ance to Asia policy. April 2014, Washington DC. 
8 For the most recent example, see Defense Secretary Hagel’s speech deliv-
ered at Shangri La Dialogue, May 31 2014. 
9  Interview with OSD official. December 2013, Pentagon, Washington DC.
10 See “Rebalancing the Rebalance: Resourcing U.S. Diplomatic Strategy in 
the Asia Pacific Region”, Majority Staff Report, US Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, April 17, 2014. 
11 Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Johnathan Greenert, speech delivered 
at CSIS, May 19, 2014.
12 For instance, in 2013 Congressional testimony PACOM Commander Lock-
lear offered a modified version of the template I use below with only four 
components, including “planning for operations and contingencies” 
which is not included here.
13 Telephone interview with Lt. Gen. (ret.) Wallace Gregson, December 2013, 
Washington DC. General Gregson served as Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs from 2009 to 2011. 
ment with the Philippines for an increased US military pres-
ence.4  
Yet this short-term emphasis on military achievements has 
caused some critics to suggest the Obama administration’s 
rebalance to Asia may be committing a two-fold error of 
“being all bark and no bite.”5 That is, they argue it unneces-
sarily antagonizes China with a military-centric messaging 
of the rebalance, while simultaneously under-delivering 
the military hardware necessary to alter China’s perception 
of the strength of the US military presence in the region. 
Tellingly, both critics and advocates of current US military 
rebalancing efforts have expressed concern that the Obama 
administration is moving ahead without providing clear stra-
tegic guidelines for what it wants the military to accomplish 
(more on this below). This ambiguity has required DoD plan-
ners to adopt definitions for the rebalance that are flexible on 
content, such as “it is a holding group for our policies and 
initiatives for the region…it is not just one policy.”6 It has also 
led to critical assessments of administration directives aimed 
at Asia Pacific force posture, such as Ashton Carter’s remarks 
of “no change in Marine Corps presence west of the interna-
tional dateline”, that fall well short of coherent strategy.7
  
In a parallel, long-term framework, the Pentagon has con-
textualized the military’s place within the rebalance to Asia 
both forwards and backwards, in terms of “seven decades of 
commitment and history of commitment”8 extending back to 
WWII and out to 2020 and beyond. Indeed, one Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) official involved in the Quadren-
nial Defense Review (QDR) 2014 process suggested that the 
rebalance needed to be contextualized in terms of the last 
sixty years and out into the next sixty.9 This should not be 
dismissed as an attempt by the DoD to deflect perceptions of 
rebalance underachievement today. Rather, it is a pragmatic 
acknowledgement that the administration’s military pillar 
of the rebalance to Asia is inextricably intertwined with and 
cannot be separated from previous efforts—both intellectual 
and material—to update American defense policy in the Asia 
Pacific over the last fifteen years. Tellingly, looking back-
wards, the DoD was already publicly discussing its concerns 
with anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) technologies and 
their effects on regional military balances as early as the 2001 
QDR. This long-term perspective is also driven by projections 
of a globally shifting balance of power towards Asia that the 
military will have to deal with directly well into the future 
after the Obama administration’s second term is completed. 
Today, a large percentage of current military documents con-
textualize the rebalance to Asia as a logical and necessary 
outgrowth of geostrategic trends in Asia encompassing eco-
nomic, military, political, and demographics dimensions that 
will compel the U.S. to stay militarily engaged in the region 
for decades to come. While this long-term rebalance is clearly 
partially about China, it is not only about China, nor is it a 
policy reminiscent of Cold War containment. In the words of 
USN Rr. Adm. (ret.) McDevitt, the long-term function of the 
US military’s pivot to Asia is not about preparing for conflict 
with China, but rather proactively shaping the security envi-
ronment in such a way that conflict remains unnecessary and 
perhaps someday inconceivable. 
Mapping the Military Strategy of the Rebalance
One widely shared criticism of the Obama administration’s 
handling of the rebalance to Asia policy is that it has not 
issued a strategic document containing a singular, explicit 
articulation of its strategy. Despite claims that “the United 
States has successfully moved forward with the initial phases 
of implementing the military aspects of the rebalance”,10 
remarks made by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral 
Greenert last month regarding the strategy of the rebalance is 
more accurate and revealing: “there is no real particular end-
state yet that I am aware of or that we have been given.”11With 
relatively undefined strategic guidance, but with clear political 
guidance to initiate a rebalance to Asia (e.g. QDR 2014)—the 
armed services, United States Pacific Command (PACOM) 
and its various service components have, at different times 
and places, each articulated different visions for how they 
will contribute to the rebalance.12 Nevertheless, despite the 
absence of a singular strategic document, the military rebal-
ance to Asia has been expressed through a series of public 
statements by DoD officials (e.g. press releases, Congressional 
testimony) and formal defense guidance. An examination of 
these documents reveals a generally consistent message of 
what the military rebalance consists of and it can be expressed 
in the following categories:
1) Rebalancing the Force Structure 
2) Rebalancing Asia Pacific Posture and Presence
3) Modernizing Alliances and Extending Partnerships
4) New Operational Plans and Tactics
5) Investments and Acquisition Strategies
6) Engagement with China
                                
Rebalancing Force Structure 
Perhaps the single most important metric for whether or 
not the military can implement the rebalance is its ability 
to effectively carry out its regional mission of reassuring 
allies, deterring and dissuading aggression from potential 
adversaries, and supporting the US political agenda of order 
and peace maintenance. However, measuring this core met-
ric is complicated by the intersubjective and psychological 
nature of these italicized variables. Viewed through this lens, 
quantitative measurements are in a crucial sense only inputs, 
rather than outputs, of the rebalance to Asia, and cannot 
accurately be used to measure either the rate of implemen-
tation or its effectiveness.13 In the words of one interviewee, 
“you can surge troops but you can’t surge trust.” 
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14 Lt. Gen. Wissler, “Realizing the Rebalance: The United States Marine Corps in 
Asia” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, April 10 2014. 
Nevertheless, the DoD has made a series of high-profile 
announcements about its quantitative rebalance of US military 
forces to the Asia-Pacific within the aforementioned “litany of 
moving assets and posture.” It has also stressed its emphasis on 
quality by stating that PACOM is and will continue preferentially 
receiving the best defense resources available. Yet quantitative 
questions remain, such as Michael O’Hanlon’s 2013 observation 
that the net value of annual Pentagon expenditures on the rebal-
ance measured in terms of hardware remains at 10-12 billion 
dollars—a relatively meagre sum. 
This figure speaks to the critical question of the ability of U.S. 
military to implement the rebalance while undergoing signifi-
cant force reductions and budget cuts. Due to the strong budg-
etary pressures placed on the DoD by the Budget Control Act 
defense cuts of 2011 and continued sequestration, a common 
refrain amongst Washington defense officials has been “PACOM 
will grow by staying the same.” That is, US Pacific forces will 
grow in relative terms as they are shielded from defense cuts. 
This preferential treatment is a top-down directive of the January 
2012 Strategic Guidance and the 2014 QDR, but is it happening? 
For now, there is anecdotal evidence that it is. The Marine Corps 
has committed to maintain or increase its current troop levels in 
the region despite cuts to overall size of its force in QDR 2014, 
and it has allocated funds to shield troop readiness levels in the 
region despite degradation of operations and readiness else-
where.14 However, in particularly sobering testimony, PACOM 
Commander Locklear has said that continued sequestration has 
threatened to hollow the force and at least in the short term had 
already degraded troop readiness levels. 
Updating Posture and Presence 
Plans and efforts to update the US military posture and presence 
in the Asia Pacific region have been highlighted as key elements 
of the rebalance via the announcement that US forces will be 
“geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politi-
cally sustainable.” The focus on political sustainability refers to 
ongoing efforts to hedge against the political vulnerabilities asso-
ciated with basing troops outside of US sovereign territory. This 
includes the risk of being ordered to leave (e.g. Philippines 1992) 
as well as the risk of having US operational freedom curtailed 
due to political pressures in the host countries ranging from local 
democratic processes to external coercion from third parties. 
Efforts to reduce the US military footprint in Japan is central here 
and remains a work in progress. The focus on operational resil-
ience largely stems from new and emerging technological threats 
to forward-deployed US forces from Chinese anti-access and area 
denial (A2/AD) weapons capabilities and the need to maintain 
credible deterrence in the face of this challenge. 
The focus on a geographical distribution of forces logically rein-
forces the other two points. At a macro-level, geographical distribu-
tion involves plans for an innovative and rotational troop presence 
in the region best summed up with the expression “places, not 
bases.” Geographical distribution also signals growing US inter-
est in South East Asia. Occasionally referred to as the “rebalance 
within the rebalance”, deployments to Singapore and Australia, 
and growing ties with Indonesia are indicative of this trend. 
Modernizing Alliances and Extending Partnerships
Modernizing the five formal military alliances the US has with 
Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand and 
developing new security partnerships is a critical component 
of the rebalance. Official Pentagon statements outlining a need 
to “…strengthen alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific 
so that we can more efficiently and effectively advance a com-
mon security vision for the future” speak to a desire to shift 
away from the traditional Cold War “hub and spokes” model 
towards a more integrated network of overlapping, coordinated 
(and ideally shared) defense capabilities and commitments.15  
Driven in part by declining US defense budgets, the DoD is 
looking to use targeted FMS and joint training and exercises 
to strengthen the capabilities of allies and partners. It is also 
seeking multilateral security gains by coordination in areas 
like information sharing, submarine networking, and bal-
listic missile defense. These efforts have not been easy, with 
historical grievances hindering important trilateral security 
cooperation between Japan and South Korea specifically. 
The increasing strategic relevance of “partnerships” is related 
to operational concepts focusing less on bases and more on 
places — that is, increased rotational or ad hoc access to 
a much wider set of locations rather than an emphasis on 
building new large and permanent bases. Rebalance policy 
successes include the Littoral Combat Ship deployments 
in Singapore and continue to grow at a fast rate, with the 
PACOM Commander testifying earlier this year that the US is 
pursuing partnerships with 11 new countries in the region. 
Indonesia, for example, is already allowing site access for 
American P-3 and P-8 maritime patrol craft operations. 
Operational Plans, Concepts, and Tactics
Pentagon officials discussing operational plans in the context 
of the pivot to Asia have typically focused on current efforts by 
the US military to develop techniques to guarantee US forces 
assured access in the face of growing threats from anti-access 
and area-denial (A2/AD) technologies being developed by 
China. This requirement of maintaining assured access is now 
a key element of current DoD strategic guidance, and we are 
already witnessing a period of competing strategic concepts—
assured access versus A2AD—that parallels the technological 
aspect of this competition between the US and China.  
Intriguingly, one key problem for the rebalance has been the 
messaging of its operational plans. Although the Joint Opera-
tional Access Concept (JOAC) released in January 2012 was 
specifically designed to address the A2AD threat, the JOAC 
has been publicly overshadowed by the highly controversial 
concept of Air Sea Battle (ASB). ASB has been criticized along 
four basic lines: 1) it is a militarily provocative operational 
plan that demonizes China; 2) it is expensive and technol-
ogy-centric in a time of fiscal austerity; 3) its content remains 
opaque to US regional allies and thus unusable as a tool of 
reassurance; 4) its focus on high-intensity warfare renders it 
useless as a deterrent to the small-scale acts of regional “tai-
lored coercion” by China. In reality, defense insiders stress 
that ASB should be seen as providing combatant command-
ers with a toolbox rather than a strategy, and that it remains a 
work in progress. And progress appears to be occurring with 
Admiral Greenert stating that the Air Sea Battle Office has 
come up with “more than 200 initiatives” underway. 
15 Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, and David 
Helvey, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, Joint 
Statement before House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, Au-
gust 1 2012. 
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The US Army, which has largely been left out of the Air Sea 
Battle concept, has looked to increase its relevance and role 
in the rebalance in a number of ways, including its Region-
ally Aligned Forces concept. The USARPAC has also begun to 
explore a new deployment concept called “Pacific Pathways” 
designed to enhance its training engagements in the region.  
 
Investments and Acquisition Strategies 
Acquisition strategies and investments in force moderniza-
tion is another important aspect of the rebalance to Asia pol-
icy discussed by the DoD. One crucial question will be how 
decades-long defense acquisition cycles will be influenced by 
an iterative strategic process between the United States and 
China as each acts and reacts to the other’s military capabili-
ties. This need not be understood as an arms race, yet such 
a reflexive A2AD and counter-A2AD dynamic is already well 
underway within the region.
     
Publicly, the Pentagon has committed to “invest in capabilities 
that are most relevant to the Asia-Pacific” such as the fifth gen-
eration F-35 stealth fighter, the Virginia class submarine and 
Payload Module, the P-8 maritime patrol craft, and the LRS-B 
long range bomber.16 These rebalance-centric technologies, 
platforms and weapons systems featuring enhanced intel-
ligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), stealth, and long-
range capabilities are specifically designed to operate in a future 
Asia Pacific theater characterized by an A2AD environment. 
However, the Pentagon’s ability to follow through with these 
investments has been called into question by Frank Kendall, 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics who testified this year that defense budget cuts 
are disproportionately affecting investments, research and 
development, and procurement. 
One avenue being explored by the DoD via the rebalance that 
may mitigate some of this risk is extended and deepened 
consultation and cooperation in investment and acquisition 
planning between the US and its allies and partners in the 
Asia Pacific.   However, these efforts have also been slowed 
by both the absence of a coherent US vision of what partner-
ship capacity is necessary, and by a lack of White House 
guidance to its allies explaining the capabilities that it wants 
them to develop. 
Engagement with China
A core tenet of the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia 
is that the US must proactively engage with China, and mili-
tary to military diplomacy and engagement is a part of the 
Pentagon’s rebalance effort. Over the long term, as China’s 
armed forces (and its navy in particular) expands its opera-
tions in the region, this US engagement will be focused on 
shaping a rising Chinese military to play a responsible and 
constructive role in regional security, and to observe inter-
national laws and norms of behavior. US encouragement of 
Chinese participation or observer status in regional military 
exercises such as Cobra Gold, Exercise Balikan, and for the 
first time this year’s RIMPAC exercise is a critical element of 
this outreach—although levels of such participation by China 
remain limited by Congress. 
Conclusion
Assessments of the military dimension of the Obama Admin-
istration’s rebalance to Asia must take into account both 
its short-term and long-term facets—the latter of which 
predate and will outlast the current administration. Future 
attempts to measure the degree to which the policy is being 
implemented should account for each of these six different 
dimensions of the rebalance, and be analytically sensitive to 
the fundamentally intersubjective nature of the Rebalance to 
Asia’s core function: reassuring US allies in the region and 
deterring potential adversaries.  
16 See Congressional testimony by Michael Lumpkin, acting Undersecretary 
of Defense for Planning, “Rebalancing to the Asia Pacific Region. January 
28, 2014.
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